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ABSTRACT 
These Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) identify the operational conditions, boundaries, 
and administrative controls for the safe operation of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) at 
Sandia National Laboratories, in compliance with 10 CFR 830, "Nuclear Safety Management." 
The bases for the TSRs are established in the AHCF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which 
was issued in compliance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, "Safety Basis Requirements." The 
AHCF Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) apply only to the ventilation system, the high 
efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and the inventory. Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 
apply to the ventilation system, HEPA filters, and associated monitoring equipment; to certain 
passive design features; and to the inventory. No Safety Limits are necessary, because the 
AHCF is a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility. 
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TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
for the 
 
AUXILIARY HOT CELL FACILITY 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This document provides the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for the Auxiliary Hot Cell 
Facility (AHCF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).  The bases for the TSRs are established 
in the AHCF Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), which was issued in compliance with 10 CFR 
830, “Nuclear Safety Management,” Subpart B, “Safety Basis Requirements.”  The TSRs 
compile the requirements that define the conditions, the safe boundaries, and the administrative 
controls (ACs) necessary to ensure the safe operation of the AHCF and to reduce the potential 
risk to the public and facility workers from uncontrolled releases of RADIOACTIVE or other 
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL.  These requirements constitute an agreement between the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) and SNL management regarding the safe operation of the AHCF. 
 
This document conforms to the outline provided in the DOE guidance document, “Implementa-
tion Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements” (DOE 2003).  Section 1, “Use 
and Application,” contains basic information and instructions for using and applying the TSRs.  
Section 2, “Safety Limits,” does not apply to the AHCF, because the AHCF is a Hazard 
Category 3 nuclear facility.  Section 3/4, “Operational Limits and Surveillance Requirements,” 
presents the applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and discusses the MODES, 
Action Statements, and Surveillance Requirements associated with each limit.  Section 5, 
“Administrative Controls,” sets forth the programmatic and other commitments that are 
necessary to 1) ensure the validity of the assumptions in the TSR Bases; 2) ensure worker safety 
and defense in depth; and 3) effectively manage operational safety.  Appendix A, “Bases for the 
Technical Safety Requirements,” provides the rationale underlying the various TSR controls.  
 
The AHCF is divided into two Zones.  Zone 1 encompasses the AHCF ventilation system, 
including the hot cell; fume hood; high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter bank; exhaust fan; 
and ductwork to the hot cell, fume hood, and temporary room if the latter is in place.  The overall 
Building 6597 ventilation system services Zone 2, which encompasses everything outside Zone 
1.  MODES apply individually to the hot cell, fume hood, and temporary room, which are the 
only AHCF structures attached to the Zone-1 ventilation system.  The Zone-1 ventilation system 
controls the release of contaminants to the general environment. 
 
Under most circumstances, the AHCF will be either in OPERATION MODE or in SHUTDOWN 
MODE.  Any activity that presents an airborne contamination hazard must take place in 
OPERATION MODE.  Activities that present no airborne contamination hazard may take place 
regardless of the status of the ventilation system.   SHUTDOWN MODE might be used, for 
example, for non-work hours, holiday periods, or planned maintenance.  RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS will be removed or placed in a SAFE CONFIGURATION in OPERATION 
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MODE or WARM STANDBY MODE before entry into SHUTDOWN MODE.  No special 
restart procedures are required after entering SHUTDOWN MODE at the AHCF.   
 
WARM STANDBY MODE provides an orderly procedure for moving from OPERATION 
MODE to SHUTDOWN MODE in the face of an unforeseen event.  Such unforeseen events 
might include equipment malfunction or unplanned power outage, for example, while the AHCF 
is in OPERATION MODE. 
 
MODES do not apply to other AHCF structures, e.g., silos, or to activities that present no 
airborne contamination hazard.   
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SECTION 1 
 
USE AND APPLICATION 
 
 
1.0 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these 
TSRs and bases. 
 
Definitions 
 
ACTION That part of a TSR that prescribes required actions to be taken under 
designated conditions within specified completion times. 
 
CALIBRATE To quantitatively VERIFY or adjust a CHANNEL such that its output 
corresponds with acceptable accuracy to known values of the parameter 
that the CHANNEL measures. 
 
CHANNEL The combination of sensor, line, amplifier, and output devices that are 
connected for the purpose of measuring the value of a parameter. 
 
CHANNEL The injection of a simulated or actual signal into the CHANNEL as close  
FUNCTIONAL to the sensor as practicable, to VERIFY CHANNEL OPERABILITY,  
TEST including required alarms, interlocks, actuation/trip functions, and 
CHANNEL failure trips. 
 
 The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by any series of 
sequential, overlapping, or total CHANNEL steps that test the entire 
CHANNEL. 
 
HAZARDOUS Any solid, liquid, or gaseous material that is toxic, explosive, flammable, 
MATERIAL corrosive, or otherwise physically or biologically threatening to health.  
 
IMMEDIATELY A completion time when a condition cannot be permitted to continue and 
the required ACTION must be initiated without delay and continued until 
the required ACTION is completed. 
 
IN-SERVICE A system, subsystem, component, or device is IN-SERVICE when it is in 
place and performing its specified function.  
 
LCO A definition of the limits that represent the lowest functional capability or 
performance level of safety SSCs required to perform an activity safely. 
 
MODE Any combination of facility condition, activities, and material 
configuration specified in Table 1. 
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OPERABLE/ A system, subsystem, component, or device is OPERABLE or has  
OPERABILITY OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function.  
 
RADIOACTIVE Any material that undergoes radioactive decay. 
MATERIAL 
 
SAFE A chemical or physical form of material  or the arrangement of material or 
CONFIGURATION equipment that minimizes risk. 
 
SHALL Denotes a requirement. 
 
SR A short description of a required surveillance and its frequency of 
performance. 
 
VERIFY To confirm and substantiate that an activity or condition has been 
implemented in conformance with the specified requirements.  
Manipulation of equipment or instrumentation to conform with the 
specified requirement is not permitted.  Methods other than direct 
observation may be used. 
 
 
Acronyms 
 
AC  Administrative Control 
AHCF  Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility 
cfm  cubic feet per minute 
CSA  Criticality safety assessment 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DOE/SSO DOE/Sandia Site Office 
DSA  Documented Safety Analysis  
ES&H  Environment, Safety & Health 
fpm  feet per minute 
HEPA  High Efficiency Particulate Air 
LCO  Limiting Condition for Operation 
MIP  Maintenance Implementation Plan 
NFSC  Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee 
QAPP  Quality Assurance Program Plan 
RCSC  Radiological and Criticality Safety Committee 
RPPM  Radiological Protection Procedures Manual 
RREP  Research Reactor and Experimental Programs 
SIRAS  Sandia Independent Review and Appraisal System 
SNL  Sandia National Laboratories 
SR  Surveillance Requirement 
TA-V  Technical Area V 
TSR  Technical Safety Requirement 
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USQ Unreviewed Safety Question 
WC Water column 
 
1.1 MODES  
 
AHCF MODES are summarized in Table 1. 
 
1.2 FREQUENCIES 
 
This section defines the proper use and application of frequency requirements.  Each surveillance 
requirement (SR) has a specified frequency that must be met in order to meet the associated 
LCO.  An understanding of the correct application of the specified frequency is necessary for 
compliance with the SR. 
 
The frequency notations, as used in the surveillances and elsewhere in this document, are defined 
as follows. 
 
Notation Minimum Frequency 
  
Daily At least once every 24 hours 
Weekly At least once every 7 days 
Quarterly At least once every 90 days 
Annually At least once every 365 days 
 
Generic surveillance requirement SR 4.0.2 (see Section 4.0) applies to these definitions. 
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SECTION 2 
 
SAFETY LIMITS 
 
 
2.0 SAFETY LIMITS  
 
This section is not applicable to Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility operations, because the AHCF is a 
Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility that does not have significant off-site impacts.  
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SECTION 3/4 
 
OPERATIONAL LIMITS AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
MODES apply individually to the hot cell, fume hood, and temporary room, which are the only 
AHCF structures attached to the Zone-1 ventilation system.  MODES do not apply to other 
AHCF structures, e.g., silos, or to activities that present no airborne contamination hazard.  
Activities that present no airborne contamination hazard may take place regardless of the status 
of the ventilation system.    
 
Under most circumstances, the AHCF will be either in OPERATION MODE or in SHUTDOWN 
MODE.  SHUTDOWN MODE might be used, for example, for non-work hours, holiday periods, 
or planned maintenance.  RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS will be removed or placed in a SAFE 
CONFIGURATION in OPERATION MODE or WARM STANDBY MODE before entry into 
SHUTDOWN MODE.  No special restart procedures are required after entering SHUTDOWN 
MODE at the AHCF. 
 
Zone 1 encompasses the AHCF ventilation system, including the hot cell; fume hood; HEPA 
filter bank; exhaust fan; and ductwork to the hot cell, fume hood, and temporary room if the 
latter is in place.  The overall Building 6597 ventilation system services Zone 2, which 
encompasses everything outside Zone 1. 
 
3.0 GENERIC LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 
 
3.0.1 LCOs SHALL be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the 
Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2. 
 
3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS SHALL be 
met.  If the LCO is restored before the specified completion time(s) expires, 
completion of the ACTION is not required, unless otherwise stated. 
 
3.0.3 When an LCO is not met, and the associated ACTIONS are not met, or when an 
associated ACTION is not provided, the facility SHALL be placed in a MODE or 
another specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.  If the LCO is 
applicable in all MODES, the facility shall be placed in the safest MODE.   
 
3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, a MODE or other specified condition in the 
Applicability SHALL not be entered, except when the associated ACTIONS to be 
entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in 
the applicability statement for an unlimited period of time.  LCO 3.0.4 SHALL 
not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability 
that are required to comply with ACTIONS. 
 
 Exceptions to LCO 3.0.4 are stated in the individual LCOs.  When an individual 
LCO states that LCO 3.0.4 does not apply, then it allows entry into MODES or 
other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to 
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be entered permit operation in the MODE or other specified condition for only a 
limited time. 
 
3.0.5 Equipment removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with 
ACTIONS may be returned to service under administrative control solely to 
perform testing required to demonstrate its OPERABILITY or the 
OPERABILITY of other equipment.  This is an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for the 
system returned to service under administrative control to perform the testing 
required to demonstrate OPERABILITY. 
 
3.0.6 When a support system is declared inoperable, the supported system is also 
required to be declared inoperable.  However, only the support system’s 
ACTIONS are required to be entered.  This is a clarification of the definition of 
OPERABILITY.  
 
 
4.0 GENERIC SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
4.0.1 SRs SHALL be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the 
Applicability for individual LCOs unless otherwise stated in the SR.  Failure to 
meet a surveillance requirement (whether such failure is experienced during the 
performance of the surveillance or between performances of the surveillance) 
SHALL constitute failure to meet the LCO statement.  Failure to perform a 
surveillance within the specified frequency SHALL constitute failure to meet the 
LCO, except as provided in SR 4.0.3.  Surveillances do not have to be performed 
on inoperable equipment or variables outside specified limits. 
 
4.0.2 The specified frequency for each SR is met if the surveillance is performed within 
1.25 times the interval specified in the frequency, as measured from the previous 
performance or as measured from the time a specified condition of the frequency 
is met. 
 
4.0.3 If it is discovered that a surveillance was not performed within its specified 
frequency, compliance with the requirement to declare the LCO statement not met 
may be delayed from the time of discovery up to 24 hours or up to the limit of the 
specified frequency, whichever is less.  This delay period is permitted to allow 
performance of the surveillance. 
 
 If the surveillance is not performed within the delay period, the LCO statement 
SHALL IMMEDIATELY be declared not met, and the applicable ACTIONS 
SHALL be entered.  The completion times of the ACTIONS begin 
IMMEDIATELY on expiration of the delay period.  When the surveillance is 
performed within the delay period and the surveillance is not met, the LCO 
SHALL IMMEDIATELY be declared not met, and the applicable ACTIONS 
SHALL be entered.  The completion times of the ACTIONS begin 
IMMEDIATELY on the failure to meet the surveillance. 
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4.04 Entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of an LCO 
SHALL not be made unless the LCO’s surveillances have been met within their 
specified frequency.  This provision SHALL not prevent passage through or to 
MODES or other specified conditions in compliance with ACTIONS. 
 
 
3/4.1 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS 
 
This section is not applicable to Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility operations, because there are no 
safety limits for Hazard Category 3 nuclear facilities.  
 
 
3/4.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 
 
3/4.2.1 Ventilation System (IN-SERVICE) for Hot Cell 
 
LCO: The AHCF ventilation system for the hot cell SHALL consist of the following 
equipment/conditions: 
 
The exhaust fan and high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter bank SHALL be 
OPERABLE and IN-SERVICE; 
 
AND 
 
The Zone-1 differential pressure measurement SHALL be between 0.25 and 1.0 
WC when the hot-cell roof plugs are in place; 
 
OR 
 
Hot-cell airflow SHALL be between 10 and 1500 cubic feet per minute (cfm) 
with the hot-cell roof plugs removed.  
  
APPLICABILITY: OPERATION MODE 
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ACTIONS: 
Condition Required Action Completion Time 
A. Exhaust fan or HEPA 
filter bank inoperable 
A.1 Place the hot cell in 
WARM STANDBY 
MODE 
AND 
A.2 Restore the exhaust fan 
and HEPA filter bank to 
operable 
OR 
A.3 Place hot cell in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
 
 
96 hours 
B. Zone-1 differential 
pressure measurement 
less than 0.25 or greater 
than 1.0 WC with hot 
cell roof plugs in place.   
B.1 Place the hot cell in 
WARM STANDBY 
MODE  
AND 
B.2 Restore correct Zone-1 
differential pressure  
OR 
B.3 Place hot cell in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
 
96 hours 
C. Hot-cell airflow less than 
10 or greater than 1500 
cfm with roof plugs 
removed 
C.1 Place the hot cell in 
WARM STANDBY 
MODE 
AND 
C.2 Restore airflow from Zone 
2 to Zone 1 
OR 
C.3 Place hot cell in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
 
96 hours 
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: 
SR# Surveillance Frequency 
4.2.1.1 VERIFY Zone-1 differential 
pressure measurement between 
0.25 and 1.0 WC while hot-cell 
roof plugs are in place 
Daily 
4.2.1.2 VERIFY hot-cell airflow 
between 10 and 1500 cfm 
while the hot-cell roof plugs 
removed  
Daily when hot-cell 
operation requires plug 
removal 
4.2.1.3 Perform a CHANNEL 
FUNCTIONAL TEST on hot-
cell airflow measurement 
CHANNEL 
Quarterly 
4.2.1.4 Perform a CHANNEL FUNC-
TIONAL TEST on differential 
pressure measurement 
CHANNELS 
Quarterly 
4.2.1.5 VERIFY exhaust airflow alarm 
OPERABILITY 
Quarterly 
4.2.1.6 CALIBRATE hot-cell airflow 
measurement CHANNEL 
Annually 
4.2.1.7 CALIBRATE the Zone 1 vs. 
Zone 2 differential pressure 
measurement CHANNELS 
Annually 
4.2.1.8 Perform HEPA filter bank in-
place leak test. 
 
Annually 
 
OR 
 
After any structural 
maintenance in the filter 
housing 
 
OR 
 
Upon installation of new 
HEPA filters 
4.2.1.9  Perform HEPA filter bank 
penetration test. 
Annually 
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3/4.2.2 Ventilation System (IN-SERVICE) for Fume Hood or Temporary Room 
 
LCO: The AHCF ventilation system for the fume hood and temporary room SHALL consist of 
the following equipment/conditions: 
 
 The exhaust fan and the HEPA filter bank SHALL be OPERABLE and IN-
SERVICE; 
 
AND 
 
 Either the fume hood or the temporary room, but not both, may be IN-SERVICE 
at any given time  (i.e., if the fume hood is IN-SERVICE, the temporary room 
SHALL be in SHUTDOWN MODE, and if the temporary room is IN-SERVICE, 
the fume hood SHALL be in SHUTDOWN MODE); 
 
AND 
 
 Face velocity at the fume hood entrance SHALL be >90 fpm (feet per minute); 
 
OR 
 
 Airflow through the temporary room SHALL be between 10 cfm and 1500 cfm 
and SHALL not exceed the temporary-room manufacturer’s specifications. 
  
APPLICABILITY: OPERATION MODE 
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ACTIONS: 
Condition Required Action Completion Time 
A. Exhaust fan or HEPA 
filter bank inoperable 
A.1 Place the fume hood and 
temporary room in WARM 
STANDBY MODE  
AND 
A.2 Restore the exhaust fan 
and HEPA filter bank to 
operable 
OR 
A.3 Place the fume hood and 
temporary room in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
 
 
96 hours 
B. Face velocity ≤90 fpm at 
the entrance of the fume 
hood when IN-SERVICE 
B.1 Place the fume hood in 
WARM STANDBY 
MODE  
AND 
B.2 Restore face velocity 
OR 
B.3 Place fume hood in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
96 hours 
C. Airflow through the 
temporary room less than 
10 cfm or greater than 
1500 cfm or in excess of 
the temporary-room 
manufacturer’s 
specifications when IN-
SERVICE 
C.1 Place the temporary room 
in WARM STANDBY 
MODE  
AND 
C.2 Restore airflow direction  
in the temporary room 
between 10 cfm and 1500 
cfm without exceeding the 
temporary-room 
manufacturer’s 
specifications 
OR 
C.3 Place temporary room in 
SHUTDOWN MODE 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
96 hours 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 hours 
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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: 
SR# Surveillance Frequency 
4.2.2.1 VERIFY fume hood face 
velocity is > 90 fpm 
Daily 
4.2.2.2 VERIFY airflow through the 
temporary room between 10 
cfm and 1500 cfm and in 
accordance with temporary-
room manufacturer’s 
specifications  
Daily when temporary 
room is in use 
4.2.2.3 Perform a CHANNEL 
FUNCTIONAL TEST on fume 
hood face-velocity 
measurement CHANNEL 
Quarterly 
4.2.2.4 Perform a CHANNEL 
FUNCTIONAL TEST on 
temporary-room airflow 
measurement CHANNEL 
Quarterly 
4.2.2.5 VERIFY exhaust airflow alarm 
OPERABILITY 
Quarterly 
4.2.2.6 CALIBRATE fume hood face-
velocity measurement 
CHANNEL 
Annually 
4.2.2.7 Perform HEPA filter bank in-
place leak test. 
 
Annually 
 
OR 
 
After any structural 
maintenance in the filter 
housing 
 
OR 
 
Upon installation of new 
HEPA filters 
4.2.2.8 Perform HEPA filter bank 
penetration test. 
Annually 
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3/4.2.3 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Inventory Limit 
 
LCO: The total RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL inventory in the AHCF SHALL remain below 
the Hazard Category 2 threshold. 
 
APPLICABILITY: OPERATION, WARM STANDBY, and SHUTDOWN MODES 
 
 
 
 
ACTIONS: 
Condition Required Action Completion Time 
A. The RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL inventory limit 
for the AHCF is exceeded. 
 
A.1. Enter WARM STANDBY 
if in OPERATION, and stop all 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
handling sampling in the 
AHCF, except to move 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 
into a SAFE 
CONFIGURATION. 
 
AND 
 
A.2. Develop and implement 
an approved plan to reduce the 
AHCF inventory below the 
Hazard Category 2 threshold. 
IMMEDIATELY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before resuming 
OPERATION 
 
 
 
 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
SR# Surveillance Frequency 
4.2.3.1 Verify that the Hazard 
Category 2 threshold will not 
be exceeded by receiving a new 
package. 
Before receiving a new 
package 
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SECTION 5 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 
 
 
5.0 PURPOSE 
 
The purpose of the ACs is to delineate the provisions relating to organization and management, 
procedures, record keeping, review and audit, reporting, and safety-control programs necessary 
to ensure safe operation of the AHCF so that it complies with the TSRs. 
 
5.1 TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
5.1.1 General Requirements 
 
The TSRs SHALL be administratively controlled.  Proposed changes to the TSRs SHALL be 
prepared with a submittal package that includes a description of, and justification for, the change 
together with any supporting analyses.  Proposed changes SHALL be approved by the DOE prior 
to implementation. 
 
5.1.2 Compliance 
 
The AHCF manager is responsible for ensuring that the requirements of the TSRs for the AHCF 
are met, and SHALL demonstrate compliance by 
 
• Establishing, implementing, and maintaining the required LCOs and ACs, and 
• Maintaining required design features. 
 
5.1.3 TSR Violations 
 
Violations of the TSRs occur as the result of  
 
• Entry into an LCO Condition and failure to comply with the applicable ACTION 
Statements within the required completion time; 
• Missing a surveillance requirement frequency (taking into account any extension per 
SR 4.0.2); or 
• Discovery of non-compliance with an AC. 
 
Failure to comply with an AC statement is a TSR violation only when an AC requirement is 
directly violated (e.g., not meeting a minimum staffing requirement) or the intent of a cited 
program is not fulfilled (e.g., a significant program deficiency).  As long as a cited program is 
functional and the intent of the program is being fulfilled, violation of specific program details 
may not constitute a TSR violation. 
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5.1.4 Response to a TSR Violation 
 
If a violation occurs, the following ACTIONS SHALL be taken: 
 
• Notify the DOE, and 
• Prepare an occurrence report. 
 
5.1.5 Conditions Outside TSRs 
 
Actions may be taken that depart from a requirement in the TSR provided that 
 
• An emergency exists and is so declared; 
• These actions are needed IMMEDIATELY to protect the public health and safety; 
• No ACTION consistent with the TSRs can provide adequate or equivalent protection; 
• Action is approved by a qualified operator or on-duty supervisor; 
• Verbal notification to DOE Sandia Site Office (DOE/SSO) occurs within 2 hours; and 
• A written report is made within 24 hours. 
 
Actions in response to immediate hazards take precedence over actions in response to potential 
hazards. 
 
5.2 MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
 
The general management structure for AHCF operations is addressed in Section 8.12 of the 
DSA.  Operation of the AHCF is the responsibility of the SNL division in charge of nuclear 
facilities.  Operational authority for the AHCF is delegated by the division vice-president to the 
center director, deputy director, and department manager.  Line management is responsible for 
the health and safety of ACHF personnel. 
 
5.3 PROCEDURES 
 
Procedures/instructions SHALL be established, implemented, and maintained for activities in 
support of the TSRs.  AHCF Operating Procedures SHALL govern the basic aspects of operation 
for startup, operation, shutdown and material handling.  This includes maintenance procedures 
for safety-related equipment, abnormal or alarm procedures, emergency or accident procedures, 
surveillance procedures, and procedures to execute the basics of the TSR programs. 
 
The access-control provisions of the Radiological Protection Procedures Manual (RPPM; SNL 
latest issue f) SHALL be incorporated into AHCF procedures and SHALL apply to all operations 
and maintenance activities at the AHCF. 
 
A campaign plan and package-specific work instructions for safe handling and expected short-
term storage at the AHCF SHALL address the following elements: 
• existing characterization information, including known package contents, nuclear 
material accountability, and safeguards and security requirements; 
• total AHCF inventory after the package is introduced;  
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• fissile-material inventory limitations; 
• potential for specific hazards, including  
− criticality potential, 
− radiological concerns,  
− liquids,  
− combustible or flammable materials (including the potential for flammable gas 
generated by hydrolysis),  
− reactive or pyrophoric materials,  
− toxic materials, or 
− pressurized containers; 
• handling considerations; 
• storage requirements at the AHCF; and  
• contingency planning. 
Some or all of these elements may be addressed in a single campaign plan that encompasses the 
handling requirements for a number of related packages or in other technical work documents.   
 
All material SHALL be contained in strong/tight packaging, as defined in the Environment, 
Safety and Health (ES&H) Manual (SNL latest issue c), or the equivalent for arrival, departure, 
and short-term storage at the AHCF. 
 
5.4 PROGRAMS 
 
The programs addressed in this section SHALL be established and implemented. 
 
5.4.1 Radiation Protection Program 
 
Roles, responsibilities, and requirements for radiation protection of AHCF personnel are 
described in the ES&H Manual Supplement Radiological Protection Procedures Manual 
(RPPM; SNL latest issue f).  The radiological control program is described in Chapter 7 of the 
DSA. 
 
Access controls SHALL be established for work on exposed sources behind the permanent shield 
wall and for in-air transfers. 
 
5.4.2 Industrial Safety, Industrial Hygiene, and Fire Protection Programs 
 
Industrial safety, fire protection, and industrial hygiene at the AHCF are implemented in 
accordance with the ES&H Manual (SNL latest issue c), which satisfies the worker-protection 
requirements of DOE Order 420.1A (DOE 2002).  The requirements contained in these chapters 
are supplemented by requirements contained in ES&H Manual Supplements. 
 
The ES&H Manual satisfies the fire protection requirements contained in DOE Order 420.1A 
(DOE 1996).  Combustible and flammable materials SHALL be limited to materials necessary to 
AHCF operations to the extent practicable. 
 
The SNL/NM Industrial Hygiene Program is also summarized in Section 8.3.1 of the DSA. 
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5.4.3 Conduct of Operations Program 
 
Conduct of operations at the AHCF is implemented by means of the Conduct of Operations 
Manual for Technical Area V (TA-V) Nuclear Facilities (SNL latest issue b).  The broad 
principles and objectives of this manual are that all work be managed with a consistent and 
auditable set of requirements, standards, and responsibilities that result in improved quality, 
reliability, and safety of operations.  The procedures and instructions contained in this manual 
address each of the eighteen sections of DOE Order 5480.19 (DOE 1992).  The Conduct of 
Operations for the AHCF is summarized in Section 8.6.1 of the AHCF DSA. 
 
5.4.4 Maintenance Program 
 
Maintenance at the AHCF is implemented by means of the SNL Nuclear Facility Maintenance 
Implementation Plan (MIP) (SNL latest issue e).  This plan encompasses the requirements of 
Chapter II of DOE Order 4330.4B (DOE 1994) applicable to nuclear facilities.  It addresses 
administrative, organizational, and implementation requirements, as well as the key functional 
interfaces with other site organizations that must be established and maintained. 
 
The objective of the MIP is to achieve a balanced combination of written guidance, personnel 
skills, and supervision to establish and maintain a quality maintenance program to optimize 
critical system and equipment performance. The maintenance program for the AHCF is 
summarized in Section 8.5.3 of the AHCF DSA. 
 
5.4.5 Configuration Management Program 
 
Changes to the AHCF configuration are implemented by means of the Conduct of Operations 
Manual for Technical Area V (TA-V) Nuclear Facilities (SNL latest issue b) and guidance 
documents, such as Implementing the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) Process for Nuclear 
Facilities (SNL latest issue d).  The Conduct of Operations Manual specifies the roles, 
responsibilities, and procedures for ensuring that any changes to the AHCF configuration receive 
appropriate safety and compliance reviews and proper management authorization.  The USQ 
process ensures that proposed configuration changes satisfy DOE requirements. 
 
5.4.6 Criticality Safety Program 
 
Nuclear criticality safety at the AHCF is assured by implementation of the ES&H Manual 
Supplement, Nuclear Criticality Safety (Philbin 2003).  This ES&H Manual supplement satisfies 
the nuclear criticality safety requirements of DOE Order 420.1, which in turn incorporates the 
requirements of the ANSI/ANS nuclear criticality safety standards.  Criticality safety for the 
AHCF is summarized in Chapter 6 of the AHCF DSA. 
 
A general criticality safety assessment (CSA) SHALL be prepared for the AHCF.  A package-
specific CSA SHALL be prepared for any package that is projected to be outside the safety 
envelope of the general CSA. 
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5.4.7 Emergency Preparedness Program 
 
Emergency preparedness at the AHCF is assured by implementation of the TA-V Emergency 
Preparedness Plan (SNL latest issue i) and the SNL/NM Emergency Plan (SNL latest issue h).   
 
The TA-V plan is an initial response plan.  The integrated structure of the SNL Emergency Plan 
provides overall response to an incident.  The Emergency Preparedness Program is summarized 
in Section 8.10 of the DSA.   
 
5.4.8 Quality Assurance Program 
 
Quality assurance at the AHCF is implemented by means of the Sandia Research Reactor and 
Experimental Programs (RREP) Quality Assurance Program Plan (QAPP) (SNL latest issue g).  
The RREP-QAPP addresses the quality assurance program requirements of DOE Order 414.1A 
(DOE 1999) and 10 CFR 830, Subpart A (CFR 2000a) and is based on Section II of ASME 
NQA-1 (ASME 1989) and ANSI/ANS-15.8-1995 (ANSI/ANS 1995). The Quality Assurance 
Program for the AHCF is summarized in Section 8.9 of the AHCF DSA. 
 
5.5 MINIMUM OPERATIONS SHIFT COMPLEMENT 
 
For OPERATIONS MODE in the hot cell, the minimum staffing SHALL include the following: 
 
• One AHCF-qualified operator at the AHCF and one TA-V manager or an AHCF 
supervisor on call within TA-V, although not necessarily present in the AHCF at all 
times;  
and 
• A SNL-qualified radiological control technician available within TA-V, although not 
necessarily in the AHCF at all times. 
 
For OPERATIONS MODE in the fume hood or temporary room, the minimum staffing SHALL 
include the following: 
 
• An AHCF supervisor and an operator present at the AHCF (either of whom may 
briefly visit Building 6591);  
or  
• Two AHCF-qualified operators at the AHCF (either of whom may briefly visit 
Building 6591) and one TA-V manager or an AHCF supervisor on call within TA-V, 
although not necessarily present in the AHCF at all times;  
and 
• A SNL-qualified radiological control technician available within TA-V, although not 
necessarily in the AHCF at all times. 
 
The package-specific work instructions may specify a greater staffing requirement as 
appropriate.  AHCF operations will also comply with SNL’s ES&H Manual (SNL latest issue c) 
for confined space and other operations requiring an attendant.  There is no minimum staffing for 
WARM STANDBY and SHUTDOWN MODES. 
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5.6 STAFF QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING 
 
Entry-level requirements for AHCF operating personnel are intended to assure that these 
personnel have the knowledge, skills, and abilities to operate and maintain the AHCF.  This 
includes operating and maintaining related support systems and process equipment safely and 
reliably under all conditions.  The minimum education and experience requirements for 
Manager, AHCF Supervisor, AHCF Operator, technical support staff and technicians are 
provided in the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility Operation Staff Training Requirements (SNL latest 
issue a).  Briefly, a bachelor of science in engineering or science plus one year nuclear facility 
experience (or equivalent training and experience) are the minimum requirements for Manager, 
and Technical Staff Member positions.  The AHCF Supervisor, operators, and technician 
positions require a minimum of a high school diploma plus 1 year job-related practical 
experience (or equivalent training and experience). 
 
The AHCF Supervisor and Operators are qualified positions that require successful completion 
of a formal training program before an individual is allowed to operate specific AHCF 
equipment or controls unsupervised.  Proficiency for the qualified positions is demonstrated by 
minimum acceptable scores on written tests and by observation of the individual’s operating skill 
with manipulators, process equipment, and plant safety equipment and safety systems.  
Qualification also requires demonstrated adherence to conduct of operations principles, and 
ability to follow procedures. 
 
5.7 TSR BASES CONTROL 
 
Changes to the TSR Bases SHALL NOT be made without prior DOE approval if the changes 
involve any of the following: 
 
• A change in the TSR; 
• A change to the DSA that involves a USQ; or 
• A change to the way that OPERABILITY or the TSR could be met, applied, or 
interpreted. 
 
5.8 REVIEW AND AUDITS 
 
Primary responsibility for review of day-to-day activities is with the AHCF Supervisor and the 
AHCF Department Manager.  Procedures written by the AHCF organization and approved by 
line management implement the conduct of operations review principles as prescribed in the 
Conduct of Operations Manual for TA-V Nuclear Facilities (SNL latest issue b).  These 
procedures address all aspects of safe operation, configuration control, review and approvals, 
assignment and transfer of responsibilities, and performance assessment by management. 
 
The Sandia Independent Review and Appraisal System (SIRAS) has been established to provide 
enhanced safety in nuclear facility operations and to ensure compliance with DOE orders.  As part 
of the SIRAS, two safety committees—the Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee (NFSC) and the 
TA-V Radiological and Criticality Safety Committee (RCSC)—are established and maintained for 
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the purpose of advising line management on safety matters relating to operational activities at the 
AHCF. 
 
The NFSC is chartered by and directly responsible to the Vice-president with line responsibility for 
the TA-V nuclear facilities.  The NFSC acts in an advisory capacity to the line director responsible 
for the nuclear facilities.  The subordinate facility safety committees (e.g., RCSC) are authorized to 
make recommendations to line management regarding the safety of matters that satisfy general 
criteria that have been reviewed by the NFSC and are delineated in the subordinate safety 
committee charter.   
 
The RCSC is the basic internal safety review committee for AHCF activities, providing an 
independent safety review of proposed activities, facility modifications, and radiological and 
criticality safety.  The committee advises line management and performs the following activities as 
set forth in an operational committee charter: 
 
• Reviews proposed modifications to the AHCF; 
• Reviews AHCF Procedures;  
• Conducts detailed technical reviews of safety analysis documents; and 
• Performs an annual review of AHCF operations involving radiological and criticality 
safety. 
 
5.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
Abnormal events and occurrences are investigated and reported and corrective action is taken in 
accordance with the SNL ES&H Manual. 
 
5.10 OTHER WORKER SAFETY CONTROLS 
 
5.10.1 Radiation Monitoring System 
 
A radiation-monitoring system is operated in accordance with 10 CFR 835 (CFR 2000b) and the 
SNL Radiation Protection Program.  
 
5.10.2 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Limits 
 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL inventories in the AHCF SHALL be limited to less than the 
Hazard Category 2 threshold values in accordance with DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) and LCO 
3/4-2.3. 
 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL within the AHCF SHALL not present an external radiation hazard 
exceeding that of a ~1.0 kCi source of aged mixed fission products.   
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SECTION 6 
DESIGN FEATURES 
6.0 BACKGROUND 
This section describes the  passive design features of the AHCF that, if altered or modified, 
would have a significant effect on safe operation.  It describes those attributes of the hot cell, 
permanent shield wall, and external-silo shield plugs that are taken credit for in the accident 
analysis.  These three design features are safety significant. 
The trenches in the High Bay are a defense-in-depth design feature and are also described in this 
section.  
These permanently built-in features require only infrequent, in-service surveillance.  
6.1 HOT CELL 
The existing hot cell was built in late 1996 to design criteria that included Seismic Zone 2b PC 2 
requirements and 1994 UBC standards [SNL 1998].  The upgrades to the AHCF allow the hot 
cell to meet 1997 UBC standards, a code upgrade that influences the earthquake-design 
provisions and load factors.  The design of hot cell mechanical and structural components meets 
worker safety requirements. 
The dimensions and construction details of the hot cell are described in Section 2.4.2.1 of the 
AHCF DSA.  Hot-cell equipment is described in Section 2.5.2.  Hot-cell structural and 
mechanical components important to safety are described below. 
• Foundation/Floor:  A thick concrete foundation mat supports the hot cell.  The floor 
inside the hot cell is raised above the floor level of Building 6597 to prevent radiation 
streaming under the walls.  
• Windows:  The hot-cell windows have a total attenuation of ~259-density-cm (102-
density-in.), dominated by two panes of ~6.2-g/cc leaded glass.  By comparison, the wall 
attenuation is ~216-density cm (85-density in.)  As a result, the windows provide better 
shielding than the walls.  Even if the oil were to leak from the windows, the attenuation 
would still be ~236-density cm (93-density in.), which is greater than the attenuation of 
the walls.  
• Window Frames:  The cold side of each window frame has a thick steel collar to prevent 
radiation streaming through the gaps between the window frame and the concrete walls.  
The hot side of the window frame has a step to accommodate the step in the window 
frame.  
• Manipulator Arm Sleeves:  Manipulators are used to handle packages inside the hot 
cell.  The through-wall manipulator sleeves have been installed ~3 m (10 ft) above and 
horizontal to the floor.  The manipulators contain internal shielding to minimize 
streaming; however, localized radiation fields in the vicinity of the manipulator pass-
throughs are higher than those for the adjacent walls (AHCF DSA, Section 3.3.2.4).  The 
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affected portion of the walls, approximately 3 m (10 ft) above floor level, is not normally 
occupied.  
• Pass-Throughs:  Wall pass-throughs other than manipulator arms and windows have at 
least a three-diameter serpentine offset to eliminate direct radiation streaming.  
• Roof:  Two roof panels of precast, reinforced concrete accommodate the roof openings.  
The modified roof is constructed of two reinforced concrete panels with a layer of sand 
between the panels.  Each individual roof panel is designed to structurally support one 
~2,300-kg (~5,000-lb) point load so that it can support a roof port and a roof plug.  
• Roof Openings and Plugs:  The two roof openings are positioned as close to the 
centerline of the windows as is structurally feasible.  The internal silos are within the 
projected area of the roof openings, allowing the silos to be directly accessed from above.  
Because the roof plugs are thicker than the roof and they are made of solid normal-
density concrete, they provide more shielding than the roof itself. 
• Internal Silos:  Two storage silos are aligned with the hot-cell windows and located 
below the roof openings, through which items can be lowered and inserted into the silos.  
Sources located in the silos inside the hot cell are shielded by the soil surrounding the 
sources as well as by the hot-cell walls.  No chord through the soil is shorter than the 
distance through the hot cell, and the attenuation of soil and concrete are similar.  
Therefore, sources located in the hot-cell silos are shielded more than sources located in 
the hot cell itself. 
6.2 SHIELD WALL 
The permanent shield wall, adjacent to the hot cell, is constructed of solid normal-density 
concrete.  It has a shielded viewing window.  Master-slave manipulators are positioned above 
and to each side of the shielded viewing window.  The dimensions and construction details of the 
permanent shield wall are described in Section 2.4.2.3 of the AHCF DSA.   
6.3 EXTERNAL-SILO SHIELD PLUGS  
Six external storage silos are located in the floor on the east side of the permanent shield wall.  
The storage silos were constructed as a unit and set into a pit, which was filled with   concrete 
slurry to a level ~46 cm (~18 in.) below finished floor level.  In accordance with ALARA 
principles, the silo pad is ~46 cm (18 in.) thick and constructed from high-density concrete fitted 
with rebar, and a steel surface plate is anchored to the high-density concrete.  The silo pad and 
surface plate provide additional shielding of radiation sources in the silos to reduce radiation 
fields, but they are not safety-significant.  The silo plugs are not water-tight; however, the silo 
pad is raised slightly above the general level of the High-Bay floor to inhibit entry of water into 
the silos.  Criticality safety analyses for the AHCF assume flooding; therefore the height of the 
silo pad above the general floor level is not safety-significant. 
Shield plugs for the external silos behind the permanent shield wall were constructed with lead 
encased in a steel shell.  The plugs attenuate the collimated radiation from a source located down 
the hole.   
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6.4.  BUILDING TRENCHES 
A system of trenches in the High Bay and Mid Bay floor has a total collection capacity of 
approximately capacity of ~336,000 L (~90,000 gals).  The trench system is adequate to contain 
fire-protection water generated by ~120 minutes of flow. 
 
 
 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS: 
SR# Surveillance Frequency 
6.1 VERIFY structural integrity of 
hot-cell shielding by external 
visual inspection 
Quarterly 
6.2 VERIFY structural integrity of 
permanent shield wall by visual 
inspection 
Quarterly 
6.3 VERIFY structural integrity of 
external-silo shield plug and 
collar by visual inspection 
When shield plug is 
removed and individual 
silo is empty 
6.4 VERIFY by visual inspection 
that trenches allow free entry of 
water to prevent ponding on the 
High-Bay floor and remain free 
of debris that would impair 
collection capacity 
Quarterly 
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APPENDIX A 
 
BASES FOR THE TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
 
 
3.0 GENERIC LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (LCOs) 
 
LCOs 3.0.1 and 3.0.2 improve enforceability of the LCOs by explicitly requiring compliance 
with all of the individual LCO requirements (3.0.1) except when in an ACTION statement and 
within the completion time of the ACTION (LCO 3.0.2).  Thus failure to meet an LCO is not a 
violation of the TSR unless corrective ACTIONS are not taken within the allowed time. 
 
LCO 3.0.3 is a default ACTION requirement.  If an LCO is not met and the associated ACTION 
statement cannot be met, the AHCF must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not 
apply. 
 
LCO 3.0.4 prevents the AHCF from entering a MODE unless all LCOs are met without reliance 
on their ACTION statements, with certain exceptions.  Thus a MODE usually cannot be entered 
if problems are already known to exist. 
 
LCO 3.0.5 allows equipment to be placed in service for the purpose of testing. 
 
LCO 3.0.6 limits the number of ACTION statements that must be met as a result of inoperability 
of a support system. 
 
 
4.0 GENERIC SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (SRs) 
 
SR 4.0.1 ensures that surveillances are performed at a frequency that supports correct operation 
of the AHCF. 
 
SRs 4.0.2 and 4.0.3 allow some flexibility in surveillance frequencies in order to coordinate 
surveillances with AHCF operations and to allow for the timely recovery from an accidental 
omission of a surveillance. 
 
SR 4.0.4 is parallel to LCO 3.0.4 in that it prevents entry into a MODE if surveillances have not 
been met. 
 
 
3/4  LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 
 
3/4.2.1 Ventilation System (IN-SERVICE) for Hot Cell 
 
BACKGROUND The ventilation system provides a primary confinement barrier for 
radioactive particles in the AHCF.  During waste- and material-handling 
operations in the hot cell, the ventilation system ensures that either Zone 1 
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is kept at a lower pressure than Zone 2 to minimize the spread of 
radioactive material to Zone 2 (roof plugs in place), or that adequate 
airflow is maintained to provide airflow from Zone 2 into Zone 1 (roof 
plugs removed).  When the ventilation system is not IN-SERVICE, normal 
operations, such as repackaging of wastes, are not permitted in the hot 
cell, other than placing packages into a SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
 
 Operation of the ventilation system is not a prerequisite for activities 
outside the hot cell, fume hood, or temporary room that do not present a an 
airborne contamination hazard.   
 
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 The hazards analysis in DSA Appendix 3-B credits the ventilation system 
for significant mitigation of risk to workers in scenarios where packages 
presenting contamination hazards are being processed. 
 
LCO   This LCO requires the ventilation system to be IN-SERVICE. 
 
APPLICABILITY This LCO applies to the OPERATION MODE.  
 
ACTIONS  A.1 
 
The requirement is to maintain the ventilation system IN-SERVICE 
during all operations that present an airborne contamination hazard.  If 
ACTION A.1 cannot be completed satisfactorily, the required ACTION is 
to place the hot cell in WARM STANDBY MODE. 
 
A.2.   
The requirement to restore the HEPA filter bank to OPERABLE within 96 
hours ensures that Zone-1 ventilation exhaust is filtered prior to release to 
the environment.  This time period allows the operator to repair or replace 
the HEPA filter bank, in the case of malfunction at the beginning of a 3-
day weekend, or time for grid power to resume, in the case of power 
outage.  It also allows time to secure process materials prior to initiating a 
transition from warm standby to shutdown in the event of a sustained 
ventilation system outage or power outage. 
 
A.3.   
If the hot cell cannot be returned to OPERATION MODE within 96 hours, 
this ACTION ensures that the hot cell is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE 
in a timely manner.   
 
B.1 
 
The requirement to maintain a Zone-1 differential pressure measurement 
between 0.25 and 1.0 WC with hot cell roof plugs in place ensures that the 
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ventilation system is maintaining airflow in the correct direction to prevent 
diffusion of radioactively contaminated material to Zone 2. The minimum 
value of 0.25 WC is measurable and great enough to ensure airflow from 
Zone 2 into Zone 1 and through the HEPA filter bank.  The maximum 
value of 1.0 WC is measurable and less than the maximum manufacturer-
recommended pressure drop through the HEPA filter at an airflow of 1000 
cfm.  The required ACTION is to place the hot cell in WARM STANDBY 
MODE IMMEDIATELY if the pressure differential is outside the 
specified range.  This action ensures that no operations take place while 
the pressure differential is incorrect, except to move RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL into a SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
 
B.2.  
The required ACTION is to restore the correct differential pressure.  The 
time of 96 hours allows for recovery from upset conditions in ventilation 
system operation at the beginning of a 3-day weekend or from short-term 
loss of electrical power.  It also allows time to secure process materials 
prior to initiating a transition from warm standby to shutdown in the event 
of a sustained loss of differential pressure or power outage.   
 
B.3.   
If the hot cell cannot be returned to OPERATION MODE within 96 hours, 
this ACTION ensures that the hot cell is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE 
in a timely manner.   
 
C.1 
 
The requirement to maintain the airflow in the Zone-1 between 10 and 
1500 cfm with roof plugs removed prevents migration of radioactively 
contaminated material to Zone 2.  The minimum value of 10 cfm is 
measurable and great enough to ensure airflow from Zone 2 into Zone 1 
and through the HEPA filter bank.  The maximum value of 1500 cfm is 
measurable and less than the maximum manufacturer-recommended flow 
through the HEPA filters; four HEPA filters are arranged in parallel, each 
with a maximum recommended airflow of 1100 cfm.  The required 
ACTION is to place the hot cell in WARM STANDBY MODE 
IMMEDIATELY if airflow is outside the specified range.  This action 
ensures that no operations take place while the pressure differential is 
incorrect, except to move RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a SAFE 
CONFIGURATION. 
 
C.2.   
The requirement to restore correct airflow measurement within 96 hours 
ensures that diffusion of radioactively contaminated material to Zone 2 is 
prevented.  This time period allows the operator to replace the roof plugs 
in the case of power outage.  It also allows time to secure process 
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materials prior to initiating a transition from warm standby to shutdown in 
the event of a sustained loss of power. 
 
C.3.   
If the hot cell cannot be returned to OPERATION MODE within 96 hours, 
this ACTION ensures that the hot cell is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE 
in a timely manner.   
 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
4.2.1.1 
 
This surveillance verifies that proper differential pressure is maintained 
while the roof plugs are in place.  Daily surveillance has been specified 
because the surveillance is simple and provides a reliable indicator that the 
exhaust fan is working and air from the hot cell is being filtered.   
4.2.1.2 
 
This surveillance verifies that proper hot-cell ventilation airflow direction 
is being maintained when roof plugs are removed, as measured by an air-
flow measuring station.  Daily surveillance has been specified because the 
surveillance is simple and provides a reliable indicator that the exhaust fan 
is working and air from the hot cell is being filtered. 
 
4.2.1.3 
 
This surveillance verifies the OPERABILITY of the hot-cell airflow 
measurement CHANNEL (including alarms) used to perform surveillance 
SR 4.2.1.2.  Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure that the pressure 
measurement CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.1.4 
 
This surveillance verifies the OPERABILITY of the differential pressure 
measurement CHANNEL used to perform surveillance SR 4.2.1.1.  
Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure that the pressure measurement 
CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.1.5 
 
This surveillance is required to VERIFY that a loss of hot-cell exhaust 
airflow initiates an alarm.  Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure 
that the airflow measurement CHANNELS and alarm are working as 
designed. 
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4.2.1.6 
 
CALIBRATION of the hot-cell airflow measurement CHANNEL used to 
perform SR 4.2.1.2 is required to ensure that the CHANNEL output 
corresponds with acceptable accuracy to the actual airflow.  Annual 
calibration is adequate to ensure that the airflow measurement 
CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.1.7 
 
Calibration of the Zone 1 vs. Zone 2 differential pressure measurement 
CHANNELS used to perform SR 4.2.1.1 is required to ensure that the 
CHANNEL output corresponds with acceptable accuracy to the actual 
differential pressure.  Annual calibration is adequate to ensure that the 
pressure measurement CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.1.8 
 
HEPA filters are in-place leak tested both when they are installed and 
periodically during service.  In-place leak testing of HEPA filters is 
covered by ANSI-ASME N510-1980 and ASTM F 1471-93. 
 
4.2.1.9  
 
An annual in-place penetration test will ensure that particles are removed 
with an efficiency of at least 99% in accordance with ANSI-ASME N510-
1980 and ASTM F 1471-93. 
 
3/4.2.2 Ventilation System for Fume Hood or Temporary Room 
 
BACKGROUND The ventilation system provides a primary confinement barrier for 
radioactive particles in the AHCF.  During waste- and material-handling 
operations in the fume hood or temporary room, the ventilation system 
ensures that adequate airflow is maintained to provide airflow from Zone 
2 into Zone 1.  When the ventilation system is not IN-SERVICE, normal 
operations, such as repackaging of wastes, are not permitted in the fume 
hood or temporary room, other than placing packages into a SAFE 
CONFIGURATION. 
 
Operation of the ventilation system is not a prerequisite for activities 
outside the hot cell, fume hood, or temporary room that do not present an 
airborne contamination hazard.   
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APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 The hazards analysis in DSA Appendix 3-B credits the ventilation system 
for significant mitigation of risk to workers in scenarios where packages 
presenting contamination hazards are being processed. 
 
LCO This LCO requires the ventilation system to be IN-SERVICE for use of 
the fume hood or the temporary room, whichever is IN-SERVICE. 
 
APPLICABILITY This LCO applies to the OPERATION MODE.  
 
ACTIONS  A.1 
 
The requirement is to maintain the ventilation system IN-SERVICE 
during all operations that present an airborne contamination hazard.  The 
required ACTION is to place the fume hood or temporary room, 
whichever is in use, in WARM STANDBY MODE IMMEDIATELY if 
the ventilation system becomes inoperable.  This action ensures that no 
operations take place while the ventilation system is inoperable, except to 
move RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
 
A.2.   
The requirement to restore the HEPA filter bank to OPERABLE within 96 
hours ensures that Zone-1 ventilation exhaust is filtered prior to release to 
the environment.  This time period allows the operator to repair or replace 
the exhaust fan or HEPA filter bank, in the case of malfunction at the 
beginning of a 3-day weekend, or time for grid power to resume, in the 
case of power outage.  It also allows time to secure process materials prior 
to initiating a transition from warm standby to shutdown in the event of a 
sustained ventilation system outage or power outage. 
 
A.3.   
If the fume hood or temporary room cannot be returned to OPERATION 
MODE within 96 hours, this ACTION ensures that the fume hood or 
temporary room is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE in a timely manner.   
 
B.1 
 
The requirement to maintain a fume-hood face velocity >90 fpm ensures 
that airflow is in the correct direction, thereby preventing migration of 
radioactively contaminated material to Zone 2.  The value of 90 fpm is 
consistent with recommendation of the Industrial Safety Council for local 
exhaust ventilation.  The required ACTION is to place the fume hood in 
WARM STANDBY MODE IMMEDIATELY if airflow from Zone 2 to 
Zone 1 is lost.  This action ensures that no operations take place while the 
airflow is incorrect, except to move RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a 
SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
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B.2.   
The requirement to restore face velocity within 96 hours ensures that the 
ventilation system is maintaining airflow in the correct direction to prevent 
diffusion of radioactively contaminated material to Zone 2.  This time 
period allows the operator to repair or replace the exhaust system, in the 
case of malfunction at the beginning of a 3-day weekend, or time for grid 
power to resume, in the case of power outage.  It also allows time to 
secure process materials prior to initiating a transition from warm standby 
to shutdown in the event of a sustained ventilation system outage or loss 
power. 
 
B.3.   
If the face velocity cannot be restored within 96 hours, this ACTION 
ensures that the fume hood is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE in a timely 
manner.   
 
C.1 
 
This requirement that airflow through the temporary room in the Zone-1 
ductwork is between 10 and 1500 cfm and within the temporary-room 
manufacturer’s specifications when IN-SERVICE ensures that airflow is 
from a less-contaminated zone into an area of greater contamination and is 
exhausted through the HEPA filters. The range is measurable, and the 
reliance upon manufacturer specifications ensures the integrity of the 
temporary room.  The maximum value of 1500 cfm is less than the 
maximum manufacturer-recommended flow through the HEPA filters; 
four HEPA filters are arranged in parallel, each with a maximum 
recommended airflow of 1100 cfm.  Upon loss of this flow direction, the 
required ACTION is to place the temporary room in WARM STANDBY 
MODE IMMEDIATELY.  This action ensures that no operations take 
place while airflow is from Zone 1 to Zone 2, except to move 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
 
C.2.   
The requirement to restore airflow through the temporary room to the 
specified range within 96 hours ensures that the ventilation system is 
maintaining airflow in the correct direction to prevent diffusion of 
radioactively contaminated material to Zone 2.  This time period allows 
the operator to repair or replace the exhaust system, in the case of 
malfunction at the beginning of a 3-day weekend, or time for grid power 
to resume, in the case of power outage.  It also allows time to secure 
process materials prior to initiating a transition from warm standby to 
shutdown in the event of a sustained ventilation system outage or power 
outage. 
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C.3.   
If airflow cannot be restored within 96 hours, this ACTION ensures that 
the temporary room is placed in SHUTDOWN MODE in a timely manner.   
 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
4.2.2.1 
 
This surveillance verifies that proper fume-hood face velocity is being 
maintained.  Daily surveillance has been specified because the 
surveillance is simple and provides a reliable indicator that the exhaust fan 
is working and air from the fume hood or temporary room is being 
filtered.  
 
4.2.2.2 
 
This surveillance ensures airflow is in the correct direction to provide 
confinement for the temporary room.  Daily surveillance has been 
specified because the surveillance is simple and provides a reliable 
indicator that the exhaust fan is working and air from the hot cell is being 
filtered. 
 
4.2.2.3 
 
This surveillance verifies the OPERABILITY of the fume-hood face-
velocity measurement CHANNEL used to perform surveillance SR 
4.2.2.1.  Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure that the face-velocity 
measurement CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.2.4 
 
This surveillance verifies the OPERABILITY of the temporary-room 
airflow measurement CHANNEL (including alarms) used to perform 
surveillance SR 4.2.2.2. Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure that 
the pressure measurement CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.2.5 
 
This surveillance is required to VERIFY that a loss of exhaust airflow 
initiates an alarm.  Quarterly surveillance is adequate to ensure that the 
alarm is working as designed. 
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4.2.2.6 
 
CALIBRATION of the fume-hood face-velocity measurement 
CHANNEL used to perform SR 4.2.2.3 is required to ensure that the 
CHANNEL output corresponds with acceptable accuracy to the actual 
airflow.  Annual calibration is adequate to ensure that the face-velocity 
measurement CHANNELS are working as designed. 
 
4.2.2.7 
 
HEPA filters are in-place leak tested both when they are installed and 
periodically during service.  In-place leak testing of HEPA filters is 
covered by ANSI-ASME N510-1980 and ASTM F 1471-93.   
 
4.2.2.8 
 
An annual in-place penetration test will ensure that particles are removed 
with an efficiency of at least 99% in accordance with ANSI-ASME N510-
1980 and ASTM F 1471-93. 
 
3/4.2.3 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Inventory Limit 
 
BACKGROUND Inventory control governs the location, storage configuration, and 
handling of nuclear material within the AHCF based on the quantity, type, 
and form. This element protects the assumptions of the hazard analysis 
that limit the amount of MAR available for potential release in the event 
of an accident.  
 
 Specific controls and restrictions are placed on the AHCF radiological 
material inventory to prevent the introduction of materials that would 
invalidate the safety basis. 
 
APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
 The hazard analysis in Appendix 3-B credits inventory limits for 
significant reduction of risk to both worker and public in scenarios 
resulting in release of radioactive material. 
 
LCO: This LCO requires that the total RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL inventory 
in the AHCF SHALL remain below the Hazard Category 2 threshold.  
 
APPLICABILITY This LCO applies to the OPERATION, WARM STANDBY, and SHUT-
DOWN MODES 
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A.1.  
The total quantity of RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL that can be present in 
the AHCF is restricted to an amount less that the Hazard Category 2 
threshold. 
 
If the Hazard Category 2 threshold is exceeded, the requirement is to enter 
WARM STANDBY if in OPERATION, and stop all RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL handling sampling in the AHCF IMMEDIATELY, except to 
move RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a SAFE CONFIGURATION.  
This action ensures that no operations take place while the inventory is in 
excess of that analyzed in the safety basis, except to move 
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL into a SAFE CONFIGURATION. 
 
A.2.  
The requirement is to develop and implement an approved plan to reduce 
the AHCF inventory below the Hazard Category 2 threshold before 
resuming OPERATION.  This action ensures that no operations take place 
while the inventory is in excess of that analyzed in the safety basis and 
that the reduction in inventory will be accomplished in an orderly and safe 
manner and in accordance with all other applicable SNL/NM DSAs. 
 
If the Hazard Category 2 threshold is exceeded by the contents of one 
container, the container or some part of the contents must be removed 
from the AHCF.  If possible, the container should be closed and removed 
intact; however, if the container has been cut open, for example, it may be 
necessary to repackage the contents for removal.  In the latter case, 
portions of the contents may be packaged and removed separately as 
appropriate to bring the total AHCF inventory below the Hazard Category 
2 threshold.  If the total AHCF inventory can be reduced below the Hazard 
Category 2 threshold by removing other containers in short-term storage at 
the AHCF, this is an acceptable means of completing the action.  
 
Because a limited number of Hazard Category 2 nuclear facilities exist at 
SNL/NM, removal of the container from the AHCF will involve detailed 
planning.  The time required for planning and removal of the excess 
material cannot be specified in advance, but the action must be performed 
before resuming operation. 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Performance of SR 4.2.3.1 assures that the AHCF complies with its 
designation as a Hazard Category 3 nuclear facility.  
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4.2.3.1 
 
Performance of SR 4.2.3.2 “before receiving a new package” assures that 
preventive measures are taken to avoid the introduction of a package that 
will require an ACTION. 
 
 
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN FEATURES 
 
Surveillance requirements for design features are not required by DOE G 423.1-1; however, the 
guidance suggests that infrequent surveillance may be appropriate. 
 
6.1 
 
This surveillance verifies that hot-cell shielding capability is being 
maintained by means of an external quarterly visual inspection of 
structural integrity.  Quarterly surveillance has been specified because the 
hot cell is a passive structure not subject to change by operations 
personnel.  Because the hot cell is constructed of concrete, with leaded-
glass windows, visual inspection is adequate to ascertain whether any 
compromise of structural integrity has occurred.  External inspection has 
been specified to minimize the entry of personnel into the hot cell, in 
accordance with ALARA principles. 
 
6.2 
 
This surveillance verifies that permanent-shield-wall shielding capability 
is being maintained by means of a quarterly visual inspection of structural 
integrity.  Quarterly surveillance has been specified because the permanent 
shield wall is a passive structure not subject to change by operations 
personnel.  Because the permanent shield wall is constructed of concrete, 
with leaded-glass windows, visual inspection is adequate to ascertain 
whether any compromise of structural integrity has occurred. 
 
6.3 
 
This surveillance verifies that external-shield-plug shielding capability is 
being maintained by means of a visual inspection of structural integrity 
whenever the shield plug is removed and the silo is empty.  This surveil-
lance schedule has been specified for two reasons.  First, the shield plugs 
are passive structures not subject to change by operations personnel.  
Second, removing the shield plug solely for the purposes of inspection 
while RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL is in storage would violate ALARA 
principles. Visual inspection is adequate to ascertain whether any 
compromise of structural integrity has occurred. 
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6.4 
 
This surveillance verifies by means of a quarterly visual inspection that 
building trenches contribute to the prevention of criticality by preventing 
ponding on the High-Bay floor.  Quarterly surveillance has been specified 
because the trenches are not subject to change by operations personnel.   
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